

OTHERISM IN DISCOURSES, INTEGRATION IN POLICIES? *Comparing French and Danish educational policies for migrants*

Abstract

In this study of educational policies aimed at migrants in France and Denmark, we examine how both countries display the same mixture of integration policies and of discourses of hostility portraying migrants as scapegoats. Educational policies are seen as a fundamental tool to speed up the integration of migrants, yet these are seen as a potential threat to national equilibrium and cohesion. This contradiction results from specific forms of policy construction and patterns of discursive spaces. This led us to argue, using the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, against a unified conception of the power yielded by the state on migrants.

Keywords

Migration • integration • education • assimilation • governmentality

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1 Introduction

Comparing France and Denmark with regard to immigration and integration issues is rather unusual. France is usually compared with Anglo-Saxon countries in order to single out its Republican integrationist specificity as opposed to the forms of multiculturalism present in the UK (Byron and Condon 1996; Thierry and Rogers 2004) or in the US (Horowitz 1992). On the other hand, Denmark is rarely used in comparisons between contrastive cases and is more often reintegrated within a general reflection on Nordic or Scandinavian countries (Kivinen and Rinne 1998; Nannestad 2004). At first glance, France and Denmark have different histories with regard to their immigrants and immigration policies, but they also present many similarities: both countries have welcomed during the second half of the 20th century a large number of first European then non-European migrants in order to foster their industrial growth, and both have witnessed a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment when the turn towards post-industrial economies rendered unqualified migration no longer necessary, which materialized in increasingly repressive immigration policies. Both countries have experienced political crises related to

integration issues during the mid-2000s due to two traumatic events: the suburban riots in France and the Muhammad drawings controversy in Denmark. These events have prompted fierce debates regarding the effects of immigration on insecurity and increasingly contentious ethnic relations. Migrants have thus been at the forefront of official discourses in both countries, although with quite different contents. In France, a Republican discourse on universalism prevails, which considers only abstract subjects equal before the law, when the Danish discourse is more oriented towards the acknowledgement of differences. However, one notices in both cases insistence on the goal of integration. Do these differences in the picturing of migrants lead to different policies and discourses in the field of education?

In both countries, issues of terminology arise pertaining to the very category of “migrant”. According to statistics Denmark, “An immigrant is defined as a person born abroad whose parents are both (or one of them if there is no available information on the other parent) foreign citizens or were both born abroad” (Statistic Denmark website, 2011).¹ Migrants and ethnic minorities are clearly distinguished here: “the former is defined as individuals working in a country of which he or she is not a national. It is a term broad enough

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to capture both regular and irregular foreign workers. (...) [The latter comprises] individuals who, while having his or her origins in another country, have become citizens of the host country" (ibid.). Yet these definitions, while appearing straightforward and based on factual elements, do not prevent both terms to be used interchangeably in public debates. The French context prohibits the use of ethnic categories in the compilation of statistics on migrants and their descendants, so the main divide is drawn between French and foreigners, based on the sole criteria of nationality and citizenship. However, the definition of 'immigrant' retained by the French counterpart to Statistics Denmark, the INSEE, blurs this line: 'an immigrant is a person who was born a foreign national in a foreign land and who lives now in France' (INSEE website, 2010).² Statistics on immigrants therefore encompass foreigners but also naturalized French. As in Denmark, definitions pertaining to this hotly debated topic appear deceptively simplified, and the category of "migrants" is therefore mobilized as a factual term used to manage populations, yet it is inherently and simultaneously subjected to larger appropriations – for instance in the media (Bonnafeous 1991). While sticking to official denominations in this article, we take stock of this fluidity of meanings that is a key element of their multifaceted political uses.

Koopmans *et al.*, in their conceptualization of citizenship in Europe, provide a two-dimensional model helping us differentiate between the two countries:

On the vertical axis, the continuum runs from conceptions of citizenship that favour ethnic bonds as the basis for the constitution of the political community to those that emphasize equal civic rights and attribute citizenship on the basis of the territorial principle. (...) On the horizontal axis, the continuum runs from conceptions of citizenship that insist on conformity to a single cultural model that is to be shared by all citizens, to culturally pluralist conceptions that seek to retain, or even stimulate diversity and allow their subjects to follow a variety of cultural patterns. (Koopmans *et al.* 2005: 9–10)

This model helps us to go beyond the somewhat simplistic representation of Denmark as a nation relying mainly on an ethnic definition of citizenship, while France has usually been presented as a good example of a civic regime. As we will see, in fact both countries have been relying for a long time on 'cultural monism' in their conception of integration, and France has been gradually moving away from pure 'civic-territorial' policies aimed at migrants, without opting for a full-fledged 'ethnic' model. From that perspective, there has been a convergence between the policies implemented in both countries, rendering their comparison even more interesting.

France and Denmark display the same strange mixture of integration policies anchored in the history of immigration policies and of discourses of hostility and rejection that tend to portray migrants as scapegoats. Educational policies are put in the foreground, namely in order to speed up the integration of migrants in the national community. Yet the fact that in both cases migrant subjects are seen as

a potential threat to national equilibrium and cohesion complicates this aim. What we want to explain is this contradiction or this paradox that, we argue, is no accident, but the result of specific forms of policy construction and of patterns of discursive spaces. This conducts us to argue, using the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, against a unified conception of the power yielded by the state on migrants: even if political discourses identify overarching rationales for policies aimed at migrants, such as the fight against unemployment, welfare state bankruptcy, or insecurity, in fact policies aiming at different objectives and using different instruments coexist. Acknowledging this fragmentary, even contradictory nature of educational policies aimed at migrants therefore leads us to re-evaluate the critical discourses stigmatizing the very real repressive turn of immigration and integration policies in Europe and hostile policies against migrants by arguing that the situation is in fact more complicated in both countries. However, in doing so – and in concentrating the analysis on the policy side – one is not giving in a unitary, overwhelming view of the state and its apparatuses. On the contrary, one is confronted with multiple sources of power, all of which aim at defining migrants as their primary target. Even if one does not seek to uncover "resistances", the very concept of 'power' is thus challenged by acknowledging its multiplicity (Coombe 2007: 285).

2 Integrating the migrants: the shift towards an assimilationist perspective

It is striking to see that while France and Denmark have a very different history in the *longue durée* regarding migration, and display diverging official discourses towards migrants – with a universal stance in France and an acknowledgement of differences in Denmark – both countries tend to favour an integrationist approach, however, with different perspectives: in Denmark, migrants themselves are strongly invited to integrate in a voluntary fashion, while in France discourses are traditionally formulated as if there were no differences between migrants and the rest of the population, and no problems related to cultural/ethnic integration at all. In both countries, it is not difficult to read an assimilationist subtext in this official position favouring integration, which content has evolved along with the shift on how immigration was perceived, from economic resource to economic burden and sociocultural threat.

2.1 France and immigration³

Despite the recent official tendency to portray France as a country of immigration since the 19th century with a long history of dealing with the presence and schooling of immigrant children or the children of migrants within its National Education System, it has been argued that until the 1970s France ignored itself as a country of immigration (Noiriel 1988, 1992). Since World War II, France has encouraged and

relaxed its national borders at different times, primarily in response to its changing economic and demographic need. In the 1950s and the 1960s, most of the people who migrated to France came from South Europe – Spain, Portugal and Italy – to work in French firms which lacked workforce. From the mid-1960s on, a new wave of immigrants came from the former French colonies of Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, later of Asia. In 1974, the ban on immigration modified radically the sociodemographic characteristics of immigrants. Because family reunification was one of the few ways left to immigrate in France, the migrant population became increasingly female and younger, when the families of former 'migrant workers' came to join them to live in France. Also the countries of origin became increasingly diverse and distant (Thierry and Rogers, 2004), with a rise in Asian immigrants (INSEE 2005).

France displays both an ancient history of immigration and of restrictive immigration policies, as the year 1974 represents a turn with the advent of a policy of 'zero immigration'. In France, as in other European Union (EU) countries, the right to immigrate seems to be in decline (Wihtol de Wenden 1999) which is mirrored in increasingly restrictive immigration policies and legal constraints: the infamous 'Pasqua-Méhaignerie laws' in 1993 and the 'Debré laws' have for instance created a system of visas and deportation of illegal immigrants. Since the termination of legal extra-community immigration, in France, except in the two first parts of Mitterrand's seven-year term in office (1981–1986 and 1988–1992), the different governments – even that of the 'plural left' of Lionel Jospin (1998–2002) – all assumed a restrictive policy on illegal immigration. This policy is expressed in procedures increasing the number of people who returned to the border, the formulation of different criteria for regularization, and a limitation on the rights of individuals to domicile foreigners in their homes in France. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the inauguration of the policies referred to as 'security measures' during the Jospin and Raffarin governments helped to maintain an atmosphere of suspicion towards migrants. These national policies relied on European measures such as the increasing cooperation among national police forces by means of organizations like Europol. The Europeanization process also facilitated the setting up of bilateral cooperation agreements with the countries of origin to prevent irregular entries and to facilitate deportation, like in 2002 with Romania. These multiple policies become concrete through increased control practices mainly through controlling identities or by closing squats, in which homeless illegal or legal migrants reside, and by enforcing an intensification of the practice of escorting the rejected to the national borders, for which quantitative objectives are now set. This focus on managing the population of illegal immigrants and the priority given to deportation have materialized as budgetary decisions reallocating resources and decreasing funding to associations dealing with integration assistance for immigrants.

The reference to 'zero immigration' has been in place until the present day even though some changes in official discourses both at the EU and national level seemed to challenge it. In 1999, following a

meeting of the Ministers of Justice and Interior Affairs in Luxembourg, France, Germany and the United Kingdom issued a common statement on immigration policies that rejected 'zero immigration' and 'total freedom of settlement'. In 2002, Nicolas Sarkozy announced the necessity to reform the 'zero immigration' policy, thereby reopening the debates on labor immigration, especially for highly qualified immigrants who can now apply for the three-year 'Competencies and Talents' residency permit. However, this shift in discourses at the top is hardly visible in migratory flows: professional residency permits amounted to 7% of all permits in 2005 compared with 28.2% in 1997 when those attributed for family reasons represented 50% of all permits in 2005 compared with 31.7% in 1997 (Saint-Paul 2009: 242). But it can also be argued that such renewal of discourses on immigration barely propagated outside the governmental majority.

With regards to integration policies, the French model has relied on a specific formula, many have deemed to lead covertly to assimilation (Brubaker 2001). For migrants or members of any minority, integration in the public space of citizenship meant giving up one's cultural particularities, while they may well be kept alive in the private sphere (Jennings 2000: 582). Assimilationist policies may well produce unwanted side-effects and indeed reinforce the exclusion of people perceived as alien along ethnic lines even when they self-identify as French (Keaton 2005). Despite numerous debates surrounding the efficiency and legitimacy of these assimilationist policies, France, like Denmark, has recently tried to rationalize and centralize its integration policies, especially through the creation in 2003 of an Inter-ministerial Committee on Integration (CII). At its creation, this committee has created an individual 'Welcome and Integration Contract' ('Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration' – CAI), which involves reciprocal commitments from the migrant (especially the respect of laws and values of the French Republic, and the enrolment in civic and if necessary linguistic programs) and the state (especially the guarantee of individual rights, and the launching of civic and linguistic formation programs). Civic and French courses, and personalized advices, are totally free. A good knowledge of French is a necessary requirement for naturalization and is often seen as a good assessment of integration. The CII has also promoted several measures in order to favour migrants' and children of migrants' insertion into the labor market (Capel-Dunn, Rabaud 2004: 25–27). However, the media coverage of such measures emphasized aspects of the CAI related to the respect of secularism (*laïcité*) and its repressive side was much more discussed than its educational one. Similarly, the multiplication of anti-discrimination measures and the creation of high profile ad hoc institutions accompanied the creation of a 'Ministry of Immigration, Integration and National Identity' under the Sarkozy administration. Therefore, despite the actual multiplicity of orientations characteristic of integration policies, discourses on immigration tend to focus on policing migrant population.

The endurance of the 'zero immigration' referential and its repressive stance on immigration goes beyond mere path dependency from the part of migration policies. Discourses on immigration are also

deeply rooted in national traditions which build on the colonial past, republicanism and the current perception of a migratory risk in public opinion. Immigration became an important political issue only in the 1970s. Once immigration was built as a social problem in the context of the economic crisis and later in the context of the ideological crisis of the 1990s which saw a re-evaluation of the Republican dogma in favour of a more positive stance on multiculturalism (Wieviorka 1996; Amselle 1996), the issue of the integration of migrants and their children became a priority for the scientific and political agendas. Since the 1990s, new debates on the French nation, in the context of globalization and European construction, the worsening of the exclusion of vulnerable people from the labour market, and the increase of urban segregation and violence made politicians, researchers, and the public more aware of the issue of immigration as such. The radical right and especially the Front National parties have been very active in shaping the content of these agendas and much of their rhetoric has diffused outside their core audience (Beauzamy and Naves 2010). Immigrants were turned into scapegoats of unemployment through the slogan of '3 million immigrants in France, 3 million unemployed people'. Welfare provisions were also said to be too generous with migrants, who were accused of taking advantage of them. Euroscepticism was also fostered by the accusation that European policies favoured illegal immigration from the South and, more recently, the East, with a new emphasis on the 'Roma issue' from the part of President Nicolas Sarkozy in the summer of 2010.

2.2 Denmark and immigration

Contrary to France, Denmark is not a traditional migration country, and historically it can even be viewed as a rather homogeneous country, as far as language, ethnicity, or religion is concerned. However, recent decades, especially since the end of the 1960s, have seen a sharp increase in the number of people migrating to Denmark. This increase might be explained by several factors, like Denmark's prosperity, its lack of manpower, or the slowdown of activity in other more traditional migration countries. Since the end of the sixties, Denmark has attracted migrants from several countries, like Turkey and former Yugoslavia, but also refugees from various war-zones. It must be noted that as is the case in France, most of them have a Muslim background, even though, contrary to a quite widespread stereotype in Danish society, they do not make up a single cultural entity, and do not share a common language or origin.

In the eighties and nineties, refugees from all over the world thus settled in Denmark; and many refugees and migrants stayed as "guest workers", often occupying jobs that native Danes did not want to take. Despite the restriction of the immigration legislation after the oil crisis in autumn 1973, which actually led to a complete ban on immigration at the end of 1973, the number of immigrants originating from countries outside of the European Economic Community, or from countries outside the Nordic area, continued to rise, mostly

because of family reunification and because of a parallel increase in the number of refugees asking for asylum in Denmark. The new legislations that came into force in 1999 and 2002 have introduced geographical quotas for the settling of refugees, who are directed towards municipalities with few migrants in order to avoid the ghettoization of ethnic minorities in the major cities' suburbs. The 2002 reform also introduced restrictions for asylum seekers and refugees, and for those migrating for family reunification.

Despite all these restrictions, the share of immigrants in this small country of approximately 5.5 million inhabitants has increased rapidly over the past decade and is now comparable with that of other big European countries. Migrants currently make up 6% of the total population, 329,940 people in 2010, of whom 178,425 are from 'third countries'. If we also include children of immigrants, who are primarily concerned by educational policies, this percentage rises to approximately 8.4% of the total population. (MFA 2006: 1). This figure is similar to that of France, where migrants made up 5.6% of the total population in 2004. The share of ethnic minorities from less developed countries is constantly increasing, a trend that causes great concern, as research has shown that the educational attainment of children of immigrants from less developed countries is lower than that of native Danes, and as, like in other European countries, the integration of ethnic minorities is more difficult when the educational attainment is lower; low educational attainment of migrants is also blamed for a series of other problems, like high unemployment rates, social segregation, etc.

High unemployment rates, coupled with the continuous influx of refugees in the eighties, generated popular movements against immigration, as well as anti-immigrant and more specifically anti-Muslim rhetoric. The Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) popularized the idea that Muslim culture and faith was an insurmountable obstacle to integration, and that there was an unavoidable 'clash of culture' between Islam and Danish culture. The Integration Act of 1999 embodied both a tougher stance on immigration, and a will to ensure the effective integration of those migrants and refugees who had already settled in the country. The new legislation made family reunification more difficult, curbed social welfare benefits for new entrants, and also established local Integration Councils with representation of minority ethnic residents of the municipalities, and decentralized integration programs. With the landslide victory of the Liberals and of the far right Dansk Folkeparti at the 2001 general elections, an even more restrictive legislation towards immigration, effective since July 2002, was introduced, canceling for instance all state funding for mother-tongue education in public schools, and several minority or anti-discrimination organizations, and cut down allowances for all the new entrants having asylum status. In a move that recalls what has been happening for a long time in France, all migrants and refugees are now 'invited' to concentrate on learning Danish language, to refrain from using their native tongue in the public sphere, and to adopt Danish values and culture (Hussain 2002: 7). Since 2010, Denmark has further tightened its immigration rules via

a points system, reflecting the perceived desirability of immigrants. Importantly, migrants can accumulate points based on language skills, education or work experience.

In Denmark, the first national integration policies were designed in 1983, with the publication of a 'Memorandum on Migration Policy' by the Danish government (Bjerg Petersen 2004: 7). According to these guidelines, until 1999 it was mainly the central state that regulated integration policies (which were in turn mainly implemented by the counties), with the general goal of equality between immigrants, refugees and native Danes, a goal that did not entail the setting up of any specific institution (Hvenegård-Lassen 2005: 6). However, with the arrival of a massive number of refugees in the eighties and in the nineties, changes were progressively introduced. For instance, the Danish Refugee Council offered integration courses to refugees in order to facilitate their integration and participation in the Danish society, and, even more importantly, municipalities began to formulate their own local integration policies.

These changes were recorded in the reform of immigration legislation in 1999, which states that it is the local authorities – the municipalities – that are responsible both for the setting up and for the implementation of policies designed in order to favour the integration of adult immigrants. Integration courses previously restricted to refugees have been extended to all newcomers from non-EU countries; this mandatory 'introduction program' can last up to three years, and includes Danish language courses, civic formation, courses on the Danish society and culture, and job training. These Danish language courses are free for foreigners over the age of 18 who are officially registered as residents of a municipality. The diploma delivered after the completion of the language course is compulsory to get Danish citizenship.⁴ The design of these courses is in line with the growing awareness of national and local authorities since the middle of the eighties regarding language proficiency as a means to avoid isolation of migrants, favour their insertion in the labor market, and generally allow for their genuine integration. This concern was embodied in the passing in 1986 of the first law on teaching Danish language for migrants, which was revised in 1994, and then replaced by more far reaching and encompassing laws in 1998 and 2003. The main innovation of the 2003 Act on "Danish education for adult foreigners and others" is to strengthen the connection between language courses and employment (Bjerg Petersen 2004: 10). The link between language learning and access to employment, which was up to then implicit, thus became explicit and central.

Concretely speaking, the responsibility for teaching Danish as a second language is placed in about 65 language centers located in all regions of Denmark, which are organized as schools and are officially recognized by the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. The Ministry provides them with pedagogical guidelines, and their curricula and final language examinations are nationally standardized. They are also directly linked to municipalities that supervise their activities, and to private companies and labor market organizations, in order to favour the insertion of migrants into

the labor market. In 2003, more than 45,000 adult migrants attended these language centers for between 340 and 2000 hours of teaching, according to their educational background (Bjerg Petersen 2004: 11). According to his/her educational level, each adult migrant is allocated to a Danish course and to a module. He/she has to develop an individual language learning plan. This individual plan has to be in line with his/her individual integration plan, which has been designed by the migrant, in collaboration with the social services in the municipality where he/she has settled.

Both France and Denmark have thus placed integration at the center of their immigration policies, in a context where the arrival of new migrants was generally portrayed as an issue to be tackled with repressive measures. Therefore the enabling aspects of integration have progressively given way to the setting of instruments aimed at policing the migrants' will to integrate in which cultural integration serves as a proxy to assimilation. In the next section, we will examine how educational policies aimed at migrants conjugate the goal of maximizing their contribution to the national economy and especially the labor market with this assimilationist stance.

3 Educational policies aimed at migrants: disparate and contested instruments to foster 'integration'

3.1 Integration policies in France: producing citizens as a primary goal

The demographic changes affecting immigration flows have had a strong impact on migrant children or children with a migrant background who were increasingly numerous in the French education system, since migrant children have the same rights and obligations to attend school as the French children, no matter their legal status. At the beginning of the 1990s, foreign children accounted for 9.4% of all children in elementary school in France, compared with 7.7% in the mid-1970s. The rise in the rate of foreign children at school until the mid-1980s resulted from the policy of family reunification. Almost all the foreign children attend public schools. Immigrant families tend to have a lower income; besides, adaptation classes for children who do not speak French well are for the most part available in public schools. The number of foreign students in high schools has been steadily rising since 1975. This increase results from the lengthening of studies, apart from the consequences of family reunification, but it is now almost stabilized. There were 137,000 foreign students registered in French universities at the beginning of the 1990s, which amounts to 11.2% of the total student population.

The French school is therefore highly open to children of migrants, insofar as equal opportunities remain the rule. As a consequence, the French schooling system is, in principle, indifferent to differences, and it is this egalitarian and secular attitude

that constitutes the means through which a direct link is created between each individual, called upon to be a citizen, and the political community to which he or she belongs, namely the French nation. However, this model has been widely criticized following the seminal critique of Bourdieu and Passeron (1970), which shed light on how the schooling system, by giving in to the reproduction of the 'culture bourgeoisie', de facto discriminated against children of low-income families. This led to a growing awareness of the discrimination against children of migrants for the past twenty years. But despite these critics and numerous educational reforms to improve the overall achievement of pupils, assessment procedures in the educational system have not changed much: they still unwillingly favour French native pupils. Language competence is highly important in decisions regarding migrant students, since pupils are strictly assessed on their abilities to speak, write and understand French language. As a consequence, the education of non-francophone children who arrive in France with no prior schooling constitutes a main challenge for National Education that strives at integrating them successfully. This challenge has been met by displaying additional resources to schools located in poor neighborhoods instead of addressing the specific difficulties met by children of migrant origin in the French public school system. Today, educational inequalities related to language acquisition, socioeconomic disadvantage and discrimination, and the problems these pose for the learner, the class, the educators and the schooling system, continue to be addressed within these broadly defined blanket policies. Sensitive Schools created in 1993 and Priority Educational Networks (REP) in 1997 continue to define priority education in terms of target sites where the population is most at risk for schooling difficulties, failure or dropout, as well as violence, deviance and delinquency. Many of the schools that fall within priority education areas or networks cater to an overly high proportion of immigrant children and French children of immigrant descent. However, paradoxically the failure to recognize the 'minority' status of these populations, while simultaneously deploying educational resources to improve their schooling outcomes, means that individuals continue to be exposed to implicit forms of discrimination (segregation, ethnicization and stigmatization) that interact with educational outcomes without these factors being taken into account in official policy discourses.

As far as legal aspects are concerned, discrimination in education in France has received relatively less attention than discrimination in labor. This may in part be attributed to the ideological premises upon which National Education in France was founded – uniform (universal), equal and secular education for all children – and the concurrent denial or repression of any and all references to differential treatment, be it in the interest of eradicating discrimination or inequalities, on the basis of 'racial', 'ethnic', 'religious' or 'national' origins. In the 1980s, the Ministry of National Education has adopted a policy of positive discrimination in favour of priority areas, in order to reduce the impact of social inequality on educational achievement. Educational Priority Areas (ZEP) were created in 1981 for the benefit

of all pupils – schooled in primary, junior high and senior (mainstream and vocational) high schools – living in socioeconomically and culturally disadvantaged environments. Schools zoned as priority education areas are allotted additional staff, teaching and financial resources, intended to reinforce existing educational activities and facilitate the implementation of innovative locally based initiatives. The Republican injunction regarding the provision for differential treatment on the basis of 'ethnic' or other origins meant that the policy had to be formulated in general terms as addressing the educational needs or difficulties of all children whose disadvantaged social, economic or 'cultural' situation hinders their achievement or integration within the schooling system. All this makes the success of immigrants difficult in French school. Private education (in fact largely sponsored by the state) is often a solution sought by better-off immigrant parents wanting to avoid the problems (including inequalities and discrimination) encountered in certain disqualified inner-city public schools. Moreover, since a number of private schools are in fact affiliated to a religious body (dispensing secular and religious education), the lack of Muslim private schools, as compared with the historical presence of Catholic and Jewish schools raises another issue.

Therefore, despite the strong meritocratic credo at the heart of the Republican ideology, the educational system is in fact relatively closed to pupils of migrant origin because, far from the ideal which portrayed the school as a haven of equality within an unequal society, removed from the social, economic, political and ethno-racial tensions that traverse society, the school has become increasingly permeable to these tensions and problems. Religion has become a problematic issue with the politicization of the 'headscarf affairs' since the late 1980s, which erupted when middle school students refused to take off their Muslim veil. Even though this issue actually concerned a very limited number of pupils, it became a new symbolic center of discourses on the education of migrants by emphasizing the apparent incompatibility between the Republican education system and migrant cultures reproduced even by second or third generation migrants. The headscarf affairs tended to construct a symbolic opposition between Republican ideals and policies, secularism and gender equality on the one hand and tradition, immigration of dubious legality, and obscurantism on the other hand. The educational system and its treatment of migrant pupils are thus evaluated according to two different and in fact contradictory standards: on the one hand, equality and meritocracy remain the rule, in a context marked since the 1980s by an overarching objective of improving the overall performance of French pupils and students. On the other hand, the school is asked to perform special integrative tasks towards migrant children and to contribute to their knowledge and acceptance of the French history and culture – actually to their cultural assimilation. School education is considered to be the primary mechanism for the transmission of Republican symbols (the flag, the national anthem) and values: "The Republican culture which must be known and understood by new immigrants so that they can adapt to and integrate in a new society is based on norms and values shared by the citizens

and which constitutes a common civic patrimony” (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration 2009: 20). This aim is complicated by the fact that little consensus exists on the content of this cultural or civilizational aspect of the curricula: the controversies surrounding the 2005 draft⁶ which recommended that the “positive aspects of colonization” be taught at school, or the difficulty to implement a multicultural orientation to the teaching of the history of religions, reveal that the French education system is required to perform much more with migrant children than helping them gain the qualifications they will need for their integration in the labor market.

3.2 Integration policies in Denmark: language and employment as central concerns

As is the case in France, the Danish educational system is mainly public, with more than 87% children attending public schools, and private schools largely subsidized by the state. Among factors facilitating educational attainment of immigrants, one can note the fact that the public educational system is almost totally free – no tuition fees and free school books from basic school to university level – and, as stated above, the setting up of free mother-tongue language courses in nearly all municipalities. All ethnic or religious groups may also found private schools under the private independent school legislation. These schools receive about 75% of their funding from public sources. For instance, during the 2004/2005 academic year there were 21 private independent basic schools mainly or exclusively for bilingual pupils, but this figure also includes private independent basic schools for pupils speaking languages such as English and German (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2006: 2). However, state policies regarding bilingualism have become tougher these last years, with a general assimilationist policy, particularly after the election of a right-wing government in 2001, which abolished mother-tongue teaching of minority languages in public schools, seen as a threat to the survival of Danish language and culture. Prior to this abolition, children of migrants were offered instruction in the national language of their country of origin three to five hours a week, but outside ordinary school hours, for example, on Saturdays (Jørgensen 2003: 75).

The Danish educational system has been facing a strong pressure since the massive arrival of migrants in the seventies and eighties. Educational policies, which in other traditional migration countries have taken decades if not centuries to evolve, here have undergone rapid changes in no more than two decades. These changes are linked to rapidly evolving representations of the place migrants and children of migrants could occupy in Danish society. The idea of a possible rapid assimilation of migrants into the society was thus progressively replaced by the need to educate them so that they can integrate easily into the labor market: “In the United States, ‘assimilation’ was the goal from 1900 to 1925, followed by ‘adjustment’ from 1925 to 1954, ‘access’ from 1954

to 1983, and ‘achievement’ from 1983 to the present. Placed in historical perspective, the Danish system has followed a similar pattern in a much shorter period of time” (Planck Johnson 2003: 169). Nowadays, in its integration policy, the Danish government puts the stress on the role of familial environment in the educational attainment of children. Parents’ responsibility as child raisers is stressed, and the need for them to cooperate with schools. One of the key elements of this policy is to begin the ‘integration work’ at pre-school age, and implement it throughout the whole educational curriculum. Children whose mother tongue is not Danish can follow day-care offers and language stimulation from the age of 3 or 4 (MRI 2005: 2). Such provisions are even likely to be made compulsory in the future and the establishment of mentors/adult friends as homework coaches (DG 2003: 12). Therefore, if bilingualism is not really fought by the state, as it still finds bilingual private schools, it must be noted that the stress is put first and foremost on the learning of Danish language. Another characteristic of this policy is the stress that is put on the aim of insertion into the labor market. In other words, the fact that a parent’s child were migrants or refugees, or that the child arrived as a baby in Denmark should not hamper his/her later employment. Both linguistic capacities and practical qualifications and training of children of migrants receive specific attention, with a focus on practical training places and apprenticeships. For those young people aged 18–25 years, among whom a majority of children of migrants, who did not complete any job-qualifying diploma, and who need a cash assistance, the Danish government has even made it compulsory to commence a “relevant job-qualifying course” (MRII 2005: 2). In this field of vocational or professional training, parents are again invited to involve themselves better and more thoroughly, if they want to keep their allowance.⁶

Danish integration policies thus underwent extremely rapid changes, from a stress on integration via the labor market, to assimilation as measured by cultural criteria, among which linguistic skills. It is therefore not surprising that the Danish government has recently been willing to further the integration of some categories of migrants displaying specific characteristics such as a high educational attainment, and that educational policies have been put at the centre of the integration plans. The ‘loyalty’ of children of migrants is now measured thanks to their linguistic skills, but also thanks to their ability to adopt Danish values as transmitted in the schooling system. While the stress is put on the ‘burden’ of bilingualism, migrant families face an increasing pressure to enforce the ‘Danicization’ of their children, by favoring their educational attainment, and by ensuring that they learn to be good, loyal and law-abiding citizens. In short, because of the growing awareness of the fact that the schooling system alone cannot produce integration and that wider social networks play an important role in this process, children of migrants are invited to adopt a cultural and social world that ignores or even depreciates their familial origins.

3.3 Do integration policies in both countries mirror the turn from an assimilationist stance to an exclusionary project?

We find that integration policies in both France and Denmark pursue multiple aims simultaneously. This can be explained by the genealogy of these policies: they were initially designed to help integrating migrants socioeconomically into the host society, illustrating the Foucauldian analysis of governmentality as the historical development of policy instruments which take the national economy and wealth as their primary aims (Foucault 2001: 655–659). However, the repressive turn taken by integration policies reveals a shift from this governmentality perspective. Migrants are no longer policed in order to be incorporated in the national economy (although in a subaltern position); they are treated as potential threats to the nation-state. Therefore, integration policies also aim at preventing migrants from being a menace to the national culture or civilization by ensuring that they adhere to certain cultural traits, to which the national language acts as a proxy. Other collective values are thus included in this cultural assimilation project, such as Republicanism in France, the universal welfare state in Denmark. The construction of an ‘Other’ to these civilizational traits entails an exclusionary aspect to national educational projects.

This civilizational content of educational policies is not new and we might be witnessing a return to the project of using education as “a means of cultivating sections of the nation with limited cultural capital towards greater nobility, and of enhancing the moral and cultural value of each individual.” (Kivinen and Rinne 1998: 41). Such a project is similar to what was witnessed in France under the III Republic (1870–1940). Under this regime, the schooling system was granted a civilizational mission, that of training ‘good’ citizens, sharing a number of cultural traits such as the use of the French language, but also adhering to key cultural values, such as Republicanism or *laïcité* (Deloye 1994).

This last remark brings us to re-examine what appears at first glance to be a fragmentation of educational policies aimed at migrants in the light of an institutional or state-building perspective. Both in France and in Denmark, educational policies have historically been used as a way to reinforce the state by means of crafting law-abiding citizens (Kivinen and Rinne 1998: 44–45). This explains why in both countries we witness an overwhelming dominance of the public schooling system and a state monopoly over key aspects such as the delivery of diplomas and the fixation of curricula, which are managed by centralized bureaucracies. Incorporating new subjects in increasingly varied educational facilities and developing new policy instruments addressing the “migrant pupil issue” acts as a way to reinforce these institutions. Yet the multiple aims assigned to these instruments seized by a variety of actors – teachers, social workers, the police, etc. – contribute to the multiplicity of the sources and forms of power imbued in policies, thereby reinforcing their “assemblage” structure – that is, the opposite of a monolithic conception

of institutions (Coombe 2007: 284) – which allows a loud repressive discourse on migrants while continuing to integrate them in the labor market. In the last section, we will focus on how discourses critical of the achievements of educational policies may fit within this Otherism paradigm.

4 Educating the ‘disintegrated’: an impossible goal to achieve?

4.1 In France: an assimilated ‘universal’ subject?

The French schooling system is today faced with having to address the increased ethnicization of the difficulties associated with schooling migrants and children of migrants and the implications that this has for school relations (among teachers and pupils, teachers and parents, pupils of different ‘ethnic’ origins) and discrimination in education (segregation, orientation practices). At the same time, the increased politicization of ethnic identities within schools and in public discourse creates a double bind for educators and policy makers who cannot respond effectively to these issues without compromising on the basic principles of equal, secular Republican education. The Republican taboo on ethnic, religious, or cultural origins blinds the schooling system to an ever-widening gap between the principles underpinning National Education – equality, tolerance, non-discrimination on the basis of group differences – and the ordinary practices which take place daily within its ‘jurisdiction’. Moreover, this taboo prevents the institution and its professionals from conceptualizing and addressing the question of discrimination as it takes place in education and within the school. Yet it does not limit the multiplication of discourses claiming to unveil this taboo issue or point to the “state of denial” in which French policymakers are concerning migrants’ educational achievements (Lagrange 2010).

Far from obfuscating the uncomfortable truth, studies on immigrants in Europe have already demonstrated that pupils and students with a migrant background tend to underperform in France (Withol de Wenden 1999). Several indicators show it: foreign students are clearly overrepresented in adaptation classes for people who do not finish the first cycle of high school and are oriented in professional classes and vocational training. In the second cycle of high school, they are also more likely to attend professional classes than general or technical classes. Foreigners living in France tend to have far fewer diplomas than French people. In 1990, 60% of all foreigners declared that they did not have any diploma, compared with only 27% of French citizens by birth. Immigrants fare generally worse as compared with native pupils because most of them belong to low-educated and low-income families. If these facts are publicized, the explanations given to them by most political actors – politicians and policymakers, NGOs and public intellectuals – however, deny that the migrant origin of pupils might be at fault. Contrary to the

Danish case, and because of the Republican disregard for ethnic, religious, or cultural distinctions, official discourses mainly put forward socioeconomic explanations in order to explain the low educational attainment of migrants and children of migrants because they come from low-income families, and are victims of residential segregation, their chances to complete successfully the basic school programs are significantly lower. When migrant cultures are evoked, it is in their utmost 'traditional' and anti-modern aspects. These official discourses, far from re-valoring migrants' identities, in fact further exclude and stigmatize them, either because they seem to ignore their existence or because they point at practices extremely at odds with the principles of National Education – such as asking the exemption of girls from certain classes for modesty purposes – which in fact concern only a very small portion of pupils of migrant origin.

Discourses on immigrants constructed through and in the media over the past dozen years in France have clearly singled out children of North African origin as the most prone to involvement in acts of violence, delinquency or drug-related behavior, not to mention school drop-out, truancy, and disciplinary action, and more recently gang rape. Such negative stereotyping now seems to have transferred to Black youth of Sub-Saharan origin, whose failure in the school system is often blamed on their parents' polygamy practices. This negative media coverage significantly contributes to their continued stigmatization, exclusion and vulnerability to discrimination. In many societal spheres and increasingly in the media, explanations for the low educational attainment of migrants that are linked to their cultural background are often quoted, such as the size of migrant families, or their 'unwillingness' to integrate. Moreover, the media consistently depicts these youth as foreigners, when in fact they are either French citizens (by virtue of being born in France), or will become French citizens automatically upon reaching legal maturity – 18 years of age – or have the right to claim French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 21 years. In so doing, these rhetorical strategies legitimate and re-create the exclusion and discrimination that these youngsters experience in their daily lives. Equally important, they perpetuate an ideology that blames the disqualified individual and group for its socioeconomic, educational and political disadvantage, and undermine the effectiveness of the so-called positive discrimination strategies adopted in education over the past two decades.

It is therefore possible to track changes in the explanations to migrant pupils' underperformances, which reveal the composite nature of educational integration policies. Socioeconomic analyses have consistently pointed at the need for more resources, especially in areas where disadvantaged pupils are concentrated. Yet arguments putting forward practices of discrimination have contributed to the critique of this color-blind argument and asked that educational institutions examine their own bias – intended or not – towards migrant pupils. The prevalence of a paradigm of Otherism has led to an increasing tendency to blame migrant cultures for these issues: the ethno-racial (and gendered) categorization of pupils between the 'integrated' and the 'disintegrated' constructs this latter category of

hopeless troublemakers. Therefore, discourses blaming the failure of existing educational policies aimed at migrants may actually fit within a paradigm in which they are not expected to succeed, since their shortcomings help reinforce exclusionary practices against migrants.

4.2 In Denmark: insertion into the labor market or assimilation?

In Denmark, while the future insertion of children into the labor market is understandably put at the forefront of educational policies, it is striking that this goal often hardly differentiates itself from the one of assimilation: "The Danes educate Denmark's immigrant population admirably, with one exception: to them, Danish culture is the ultimate goal of citizenship" (Planck Johnson 2003: 169). This goal derives from the perception that Danish culture, albeit unified and stable, is vulnerable and threatened by outside influences such as migrants' cultures and values. In this siege mentality, educational policies serve as one of the means to preserve Danish culture, by teaching it to all children inhabiting the country. Low educational achievement of migrants is therefore considered as a threat to the preservation of national identity.

As Kirsten Hvenegård has shown in her Danish-Swedish comparative study (2005), integration is not an easy goal, because it entails several criteria. In the societal language, integration mostly relates to the assimilation of Danish culture and values, and to the building of a network of 'native Danes' relationships. In the language of policies, this assimilation of migrants and children of migrants is mediated by more pragmatic goals, such as linguistic competence or employment, this latter criteria being tightly linked to the former. Thus importance is given to educational attainment of migrants and their children. Assessments and evaluations of this achievement have greatly evolved; while migrants themselves have long been thought responsible for their own low educational attainment, and also for their high unemployment rates, the role of the society in perpetuating discrimination, and administrative failures, have slowly come to be accused too, and have led to the above mentioned policy changes. But when these changes did not bring the awaited results, explanations linked to the migrants' own behavior, or to their familial environment, have come back to the fore.

Indeed, contrary to native Danes, all young immigrants do not complete the basic school program, as many of them are already grown up when they actually settle in Denmark. And compared with the native Danes, their level of educational attainment is still considerably low, whether they are first- or generation immigrants, even if there are significant differences according to the country they come from.⁷ Among the reasons explaining this low educational attainment, researchers point mainly to language problems, low level of parental education, or the fact that many of them marry at a very young age (Jakobsen, Smith 2003). In many official publications, however, bilingualism itself is considered as a burden and is quoted as a main

reason for low educational attainment of children of immigrants, with more than 9% of pupils in primary and secondary schools being bilingual (DG 2003: 11–12). More often than not, the mother tongue of migrants and their children is also depicted as primitive, not 'useful', by opposition to more 'modern' languages, a category to which Danish obviously belongs (Jørgensen 2003: 76). In other words, in official discourses, it is mainly the cultural background – mainly the type of family and bilingualism – of migrants or children of migrants that is deemed responsible for their low educational attainment, and not the potential inadequacy of policies. These poor educational results in turn explain their failed assimilation, and migrants are seen as responsible for their fate.

In the media though, the stress is increasingly put on the migrants' unwillingness to integrate and on their wish to profit from the system (especially the welfare state), without actually contributing to it by entering the workforce, or for children of migrants, by acquiring the necessary qualifications (among which, linguistic skills) for doing so. As a consequence, the pressure on the education system is very heavy, and the children of migrants are victim of a 'push and pull' factor: they face an injunction to assimilate, but at the same time even when their educational attainment is good, they often feel rejected because of racism and are suspected of not being loyal and abusing the system. As is the case in France, in the media they are portrayed as trouble-makers, prone to violence or delinquency, and unwilling to be 'good citizens'. They embody this 'cultural other' whose inner characteristics prevent their integration. As such, children of migrants might be fighting a losing battle.

5 Conclusion

In Denmark as in France, we see that despite all educational policies and programs that were set up in the last few decades, migrants are at the core of several controversies, public debates and discourses about education and are often portrayed as a threat to 'cultural homogeneity'. They are therefore urged to integrate, and in the absence of such assimilation, they are seen as an economic burden and as a security threat. In France, the official refusal to consider migrants' origins not only hampers the setting up of appropriate educational policies, but also makes the fight against racism and discrimination more difficult in a context where discourses blaming migrants' backward cultures thrive. In Denmark, the recent and tougher stance on immigration and integration, displayed both at official and civil society levels, increasingly puts the responsibility for educational achievement and integration on the shoulders of migrants themselves. However, we see that in spite of diverging ideologies regarding the management of cultural diversity, both countries have come to adopt a similar goal – with language learning as a central lever – that is, cultural assimilation as opposed to the socioeconomic or even political one.

The concept of governmentality is useful to understand the paradoxes and contradictions of educational policies embedded within discursive spaces which increasingly rely on Otherism. It has been increasingly explored to analyze the complex arrangements characteristic of contemporary governance (Burchell *et al.* 1991; Dean 1999), be it multi-level governance (as in both our European cases) or burgeoning public-private partnerships. Yet the wide uses of the concept may lead to the dissolution of its explicative capacity (Coombe 2007: 284). Governmentality puts the emphasis on government techniques, with the population being the main object for policy. In our cases it materializes in the wide use of quantitative tools to evaluate public policies and especially educational achievements. However, such tools are inherently at fault either because of ideological limitations on the dimensions being monitored like in France or because their avowed aim to evaluate the future socioeconomic integration of migrant pupils does not match the real objective to warn against dangers threatening the countries.

However, we are reminded that governmentality stretches both inside and outside the state (Foucault 2001: 656): what may be governed is not determined solely by the state but also in a relative consensus with civil society or public opinion. For instance, the framing of migrants as a potential threat to the nation (national identity, good governance, security, etc.) derives not only from repressive public policies but also from the coexistence of integrationist policies with exclusionary discourses. In France, it materializes in contradictions between the contemporary policy discourse treating migrants as an economic asset and the prevalence of discursive strategies portraying them as unassimilable. In Denmark, similar contradictions may be identified between educational policies aimed at developing migrants' social capital and their depiction as burdens to the welfare state. Here the concept of assemblage is useful, since it helps conceptualizing the limits of governmentality.

Does the prevalence of negative evaluations of education policies aimed at migrants point towards a failure of this assemblage? It is an object of constant public debate, and even politicians who are or have been members of the Danish and French governments are keen on emphasizing the failure of the schooling systems to integrate migrants. We argue that such critical discourse is more related to Otherism than to a project to reform educational policies. The stress put on migrant pupils' low educational attainment mainly points to the majority's achievement and children of migrants can almost be considered as scapegoats in a time of crisis. As shown by René Girard, scapegoats have always been used in order to reinforce the group's sense of unity, they are arbitrary victims in the sense that they are not directly responsible for the problems that the community faces, but they usually share similar cultural traits that place them on the border of the community (Girard 1986). Would governmentality ultimately be possible without this conceptualization of potential "enemies from within"? The goals that are set for educational policies are not likely to be met, and indeed it looks like children of migrants are used as a

benchmark in educational policies: pointing at their low educational attainment serves to comfort the others about their own achievements, especially in a period of 'crisis'. We might even go further and suggest that these educational goals are not all meant to be reached in the case of children of migrants. The categorization at the heart of governmentality practices (Christie and Sidhu, 2006: 455) allows to differentiate between excluded and integrated migrants, and the apparent universality of the schooling system provides an institutional sanction to these representations.

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Notes

- 1 http://www.dst.dk/HomeUK/Statistics/focus_on/focus_on_show.aspx?sci=565

- 2 <http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/immigre.htm>
- 3 Data on the French case borrowed from an updated version of a country-case study carried out within the framework of the comparative European Union funded FP5 « XENOPHOB » project, directed by Professor Tom Burns and Professor Masoud Kamali (University of Uppsala, Sweden): Beauzamy Brigitte and Saad Tazi, "Discriminatory landscape in the institutional areas in France" (Deliverable 1, 2003) and Beauzamy Brigitte and Marie-Cécile Naves, "Patterns of discrimination in France: school and the labour market" (Deliverable 4, 2004).
- 4 Since November 2010, all migrants applying for a residence permit on the grounds of family reunification are also to pass an "immigration test", including a language test for testing Danish language skills and a knowledge test testing the migrant's knowledge about Denmark, Danish society, but also Danish norms, values and fundamental rights, such as the principles of democracy, gender equality and freedom of expression and religion.
- 5 The draft as a whole addressed the issue of the official treatment of the French repatriated to France after the end of the Algeria war.
- 6 The reasoning also applies to young offenders: "The individual family is also responsible for keeping their children out of crime. The government will strengthen parental responsibility by offering parents who do not support their children's education or follow up if their children commit crime that they can attend programmes intended to teach them to understand and accept their responsibility. If they fail to observe specific orders, it will be possible to reduce their family allowance" (MR11 2005: 4).
- 7 For instance, according to Jakobsen and Smith (2003: 16), Pakistani young immigrants fare a lot better at university level than do Turkish young immigrants.

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