

## AFTER THE 22 JULY TERROR IN NORWAY: *Media debates on freedom of expression and multiculturalism*

### Abstract

This article analyses the mainstream press coverage of the terror in Norway post 22.07.2011 and discusses how and in what context the concepts of *freedom of expression* and *multiculturalism* occur. The aim has been to map important discursive trends in the aftermath of the terror. A clear division between different victim positions is identified. One blames majority society for not granting enough space to extreme right wing views on Islam and diversity/multiculturalism; another one sees the terror connected to a majority society that already has demonstrated a high degree of hostility towards migrants and Muslims. Thus, two different understandings of the status for freedom of expression in Norway occur, linked to differing positions on the diversity society.

### Keywords

Multiculturalism • terrorism • freedom of expression journalism • opinion

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## 1 Introduction: contested concepts

In the first weeks after the 22.7.2011 terror attacks, politicians, the clergy and the royal family stated the need for more openness and democracy. A “positive cohesion” of sorts occurred as Norway’s immediate response to the terror. But a “negative cohesion” also emerged, especially in some of the social media, where the terrorist’s extremist and hateful views found some support. Another negative reaction was registered in the first few hours after the attack on the government buildings, as some “migrant-looking individuals” were subjected to hateful comments and physical attacks in the hours before the public learned that the terrorist was a blonde, ethnic Norwegian (Harr & Partapuoli 2012). These initial reactions indicate that if the terrorist had been Norway-born *Ahmed*, the political and discursive situation would have developed differently.

The Norwegian media coverage post 22 July 2011 was massive, as was the coverage of the court proceedings in the late spring of 2012 and the report from the commission that found the Norwegian vigilance toward terrorism suffering from many shortcomings.<sup>2</sup> In August 2012, Anders Behring Breivik was sentenced to maximum imprisonment after being found accountable for his acts of terror and thus not insane. He did not appeal.

Our analysis includes the first 100 days of coverage, and the analysis is based on the following research questions, developed from initial studies of the whole press coverage, where an impression was that the volume of issues related to freedom of expression and multiculturalism had increased substantially from its normal proportion. Our article investigates the following questions:


- Which main discourses may be identified in news coverage and opinion material focusing on “freedom of expression” and “multiculturalism” during the first 100 days of national press coverage post-22 July?
- Which genres were the most frequent, and what kind of people were allowed to speak (as sources) of these topics in the national mainstream media?

The article first provides some theoretical discussion of the two terms in question, secondly outlines our methodological approach before presenting the results of our discourse analysis of items covering “freedom of expression” and “multiculturalism”. The conclusion discusses these results as a symptom of the public sphere debates in Norway post 22 July. As shown in Table 1, the press material in this period was large, albeit diminishing from the first intensive weeks after the mass killings.

A preliminary analysis of the press coverage after the terrorist acts indicated that *freedom of expression* was an important issue in the debate, at times mentioned as part of a presupposed causality chain. Furthermore, *multiculturalism* (for ABB synonymous with “cultural Marxism”), suggested by the terrorist as a main motivation for his attacks, also came to be debated with increasing frequency post-22 July, both as a phenomenon worthy of more debate and as a scapegoat of sorts (Eide 2012b).

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Table 1. All national press, printed issues. Search string “22 July”: 23.7.2011 to 31.10.2011, totally 4,273 items. A search for “Anders Behring Breivik” generated 1,935 items in the same period. Source: Retriever search engine. The vertical dimension shows the number of articles and the horizontal one the week number in 2011.



### 1.1 Freedom of expression

Despite the fact that freedom of expression is founded in the Norwegian constitution (Article 100), as well as being a fundamental human right according to international law and the UN declaration of rights (Article 19), not all expressions are considered legal. According to the Norwegian Criminal Code, incitement to violence is illegal, and Article 135A (the so-called “racism article”) in the punitive law rules against discrimination.<sup>3</sup> Article 142 on blasphemy in the punitive law has long been dormant and the Norwegian Parliament in 2009 voted for it to be removed, but the decision has still not been put into practice.

Freedom of expression became a transnationally contested area in the wake of the cartoon controversy occurring after the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published 12 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, in August 2005. Various interpretations of the freedom of expression occurred in media across the world. The media coverage not only confirmed an existing discourse of blame against Muslims that had increased post-9/11 2001 but also brought forward an increased global dialogue and debate on the issue (see Eide, Kunelius & Phillips 2008; Rose 2010; Stage 2011).

From the ensuing press practices and debates, several attitudes towards freedom of expression were identified. One promotes an “absolute freedom” or “liberal fundamentalism” seeing no limits to this freedom, and viewing eventual insults as educative towards the insulted, since they (in this case Muslims) need to learn to “live with Western values”. As may be seen from the 22 July debates, this direction also argues that the best way to combat extremism is to open up for all kinds of extreme views, even if they may be considered racist or insulting. Another direction emphasises tolerance, i.e. practicing “freedom with responsibility” or “liberal pragmatism”, taking other people’s sensitivities into consideration, but still defending the right to full freedom of expression. A third dimension, “dialogical multiculturalism” may not fully support the right to provoke, as it believes dialogue to be more instrumental in promoting understanding among people, and it may also share a critique of modernity and “western double standards” with the last tendency, “religious or ethnic fundamentalism”, often occurring as a reaction to liberal attitudes. This stream is supportive of blasphemy legislation (for a more elaborate explanation of these tendencies, see Kunelius & Eide 2007).

Heightened discussion on the issue occurred during the cartoon controversy in Norway, especially from January 2006 after a Norwegian weekly newspaper published the same cartoons. The discussion was intensified anew after an attempt on cartoonist Kurt Westergaard’s life in January 2010. Several Norwegian newspapers reacted by republishing the Mohammed cartoons, to underline the principle of free expression and express their solidarity with the victim (cf. *Aftenposten* 8.01.2010).

Judging from these trends in the Norwegian debate, the first two tendencies mentioned above seem to be the most relevant for our analysis. This is also supported by Stage’s observations on perceived threats in the Danish debate. He suggests that the main division occurred between “articulations, which focus on threatened freedom of expression and threatened tolerance respectively as the crux of the matter” (Stage 2011: 38). Expressions may represent an ethical problem, even if they do not abuse a certain right guaranteed by law. “One may thus operate within ethical ideals for communication in a democratic society, that are not necessarily grounded in legislation” (O’Neill in Stage 2011:39). Put more simply, the two main positions in the Norwegian debates seem to have been between emphasis on communicative rights and communication based on responsibility as the fundament of democracy.

Another aspect of the debate has to do with the distinction between freedom of expression and freedom of the press. There is a need to distinguish between media with editorial guidelines and, for example, unedited blogs (Steel 2012). ABB did not figure in the mainstream press, but was for a while an active participant at the *document.no* website, one of the main websites critical/hostile to Islam in Norway, with a considerable number of visitors (for a detailed analysis of the blog entries of the terrorist on *Document.no*, see Eide 2012b). *Document.no* consistently presents itself as a journalistic endeavor,<sup>4</sup> while it may simultaneously be considered as an “echo chamber”, i.e. a forum where agreement overwhelmingly outnumbers disagreement both in entries and in comments to the entries. Thus, agreements on certain viewpoints are reinforced (Gilbert, Bergstrom & Karahalios 2009). Such chambers may occur both linked to racist subgroups, but diasporic groups may also look for recognition in popular and social media outside the mainstream media (Bangstad & Vetlesen 2011; Cunningham 2001). A recent example demonstrates that Norwegian law does distinguish between mainstream print media and, for example, blogs when it comes to

what is considered publishable. The government has suggested new and updated legislation to treat utterances on the Internet in the same manner as those occurring in mainstream media.<sup>5</sup>

The post 22 July period has seen a renewed debate on freedom of expression in Norway, where claims of this freedom having doxic proportions in Norway and thus leading to less vigilance against racist discrimination meet with questions of who should in a given situation define, for example, vulnerable minority status (Bangstad & Vetlesen 2011; Rønning & Wessel-Aas 2012).

## 1.2 Multiculturalism: a polysemic term

*Multiculturalism* has in recent years been subject to scholarly scrutiny linked to debates on migration policy (see Lentin & Tittley 2011; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010; Silj 2010). Questions concerning the term's multiplicity of meanings have distinguished (at least) three varieties. *First*, multiculturalism is often used as a descriptive term – of a society in which a diversity of people of various national and cultural backgrounds co-exists and interact, i.e. multiculturalism as *lived diversity*. Descriptions are rarely innocent, thus lived diversity may be split into “good” and “bad” diversity, depending on who defines and describes it. As such, the concept has been used in the press to highlight successful integration (see Eide 2012a); or to represent problems occurring in diversified neighbourhoods in political discourses, where the “failure” of multiculturalism seems to occur with increasing frequency. “Rejecting multiculturalism has become the proxy for the rejection of lived multiculturalism, the alibi of experimental failure justifies the ordering of *good and bad diversity*” (Lentin & Tittley 2011: 18). For the terrorist and his ideological supporters, diversity is fundamentally bad.

*Second*, multiculturalism can be seen as governance, as “diversity management”; and [thus] as a politics for guaranteeing minority rights. Kymlicka describes how a policy of inclusion developed in Canada, starting with the indigenous people, then taking up the rights of the linguistic minorities and furthermore in recent times, the new immigrants. He calls this a process of “citizenization” (Kymlicka 2010: 43–47). As Lentin and Tittley suggest, for “racialized minorities, multiculturalism – as governance, and as broad coagulation of public values and aspirations – has, to varying degrees, made many societies nicer and fairer places to live than their historical antecedents” (Lentin & Tittley 2011: 14).

*Third*, multiculturalism may be seen as ideology or philosophy. This definition refers particularly to the *-ism* part of the concept and has been interpreted in several ways. On one hand, multiculturalism is associated with an exaggerated and dangerously naïve cultural relativism, allowing practices breaking with human rights values (or just allowing too many immigrants, especially Muslims), based on group rights. On the other hand, it may be seen as a celebration of co-existence between different people, including respect and acceptance of deviance – within the limits of the law and human rights principles.

The boundaries between the definitions of multiculturalism are porous. Descriptive multiculturalism may, for example, be strongly or less strongly rooted in ideology; the policy definition(s) likewise, since one can distinguish varieties of diversity appreciation from different political actors. All the same, the variety of approaches to multiculturalism demonstrates clearly that the concept belongs to a contested discursive area, or as Stuart Hall describes, a “maddeningly

spongy and imprecise discursive field” (in Lentin & Tittley 2011, 12). Thus, expressions of multiculturalism as a scapegoat for the “failures” of late modern Europe, leaning on specially tailored definitions, are likely to occur also in the years to come.

## 2 Methodology

As a basis for this article, we mapped the 22 July coverage in the national printed press for the first 100 days, by combining the search strings “22 July” with either “freedom of expression” or with “multiculturalism” and thus generated a total of 325 items (155 and 170, respectively). This was done by using the *Atekst/Retriever* archive. The research questions have been mentioned above. Some articles, after a closer scrutiny had to be left out as unrelated to the issues sought for. There may also be a few articles not occurring, due to technical flaws in the archive systems, but usually this is not an important problem. We still consider our sample to be representative of what was written in the national printed press on our selected topics during the first 100 days after 22 July 2011.


Our first work was quantitative, coding each issue by categories, such as date, medium, genre, size, source's voice (position and gender, however, not including the journalist, unless in signed opinion items). At times, the boundaries between different journalistic and opinionated genres are difficult to maintain. While we were focusing on the mainstream press, we registered how these media increasingly cite tweets and blog entries as part of an adaptation strategy in turbulent times for “traditional media”, and thus our categorisation had to be adjusted.

Second, a careful reading of the sample, inspired by Critical discourse analysis, was necessary to distinguish important discourses. Here, the first analysis also went through a process of adjustment of terms, when discourses in different parts of the material seemed to be in confluence with each other. An in-depth study consisted of debates following two chronicles in Norway's largest newspaper, *Aftenposten*, one having mostly to do with freedom of expression and the other mainly concerned with multiculturalism. Critical discourse analysis is being used to distinguish patterns of dominant approaches to two challenging debates, which became prominent post-22 July. As Fairclough iterates:

My view is that media discourse should be regarded as the site of complex and often contradictory processes, including ideological processes. Ideology should not be seen as a constant and predictable presence in all media discourse by definition. Rather, it should be a working principle that the question of what ideological work is being done is one of a number of questions which analysts should always be ready to ask of any media discourse, though they should expect the answers to be variable (Fairclough 1995: 47).

The emphasis of the *variable* is crucial here, as many participants do not necessarily clearly position themselves in public sphere debates. Exposing a variety of discourses allows us to come closer to an understanding of how the two selected terms are understood in relation to the terrorist attacks. Furthermore, critical discourse analysis may identify some current (political) trends when it comes to defining both free expression and multiculturalism, and what this entails for a Norwegian society recovering from terror.

Table 2. "22 Juli" AND "ytringsfrihet"<sup>6</sup> Source: Retriever search engine, 23.7.2011 to 31.10.2011, all national newspapers. The vertical dimension shows the number of articles, and the horizontal one the week number in 2011.



### 3 Discourses on freedom of expression

The search for items treating "freedom of expression" combined with "22 July" identified 155 articles, with a maximum of nine published on 7.08.2011. Two-thirds (67%) of the items are either letters to the editor, editorials or other opinionated articles, including chronicles. Of these, 55% are "external", i.e. contributions from the readers.

Ethnic Norwegian men are overrepresented among the voices quoted (or contributors, including letters to the editor), with 63% of all voices cited, whereas 23% are ethnic Norwegian women. Ethnic minority individuals<sup>7</sup> are represented in 6% of all voices (an equal share of men and women). This proportion is higher than the average number of ethnic minority voices represented in the Norwegian press where recent findings suggest only 2% (Retriever 2012).<sup>8</sup> All in all, this coverage seems to be lesser dominated by elite sources than the one on multiculturalism (see below).

Few hours after the attack in Oslo, several mainstream newspapers closed their online debate forums, or restricted their availability, fearing hateful entries. Nevertheless, the debate on freedom of expression intensified and developed into a discussion on how to ensure a democratic debate. *Aftenposten* asked the Facebook followers 24.07.2011 a direct question: "How can we fight the ideology that Anders Behring Breivik is promoting?" One follower answered: "Newspapers must stop citing people like him." Another follower: "Freedom of Speech and candour: Rip arguments and attitudes into pieces. Discuss them to death." (Both printed in *Aftenposten* 25.07.2011). These answers correspond to the two currents that are found in the studied contributions post-22 July: The first wants media to ensure a respectful tone in the public sphere, whereas the latter emphasises that everything should be expressed in an attempt to sort out the arguments and reach a beneficial conclusion.

The salient hallmark of the latter is the comprehension of freedom of speech as (partly) abridged in Norway today. The adherents apprehend freedom of speech as absolute by nature. "In a free society somebody will always feel offended [by attendees in the debates][...] It is better to highlight the conflicts than to suppress them in the name of respect and tolerance" (*Dagsavisen* 28.09.2011), writes Professor Helge Rønning. "To 'blow out' may rather relieve the pressure", writes another researcher (*Aftenposten* 30.07.2011). In the following, we shall call this the *pressure cooker discourse*. The supporters of this discourse advocate a society

where even "unacceptable expressions" (including illegal ones), spiteful expressions on race and blasphemous utterances, should be "debated to death". Defenders of this view refer to Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg's words "More openness and more democracy". They criticise newspaper closure of debate forums in the aftermath of the tragedy. Two other participants write that "[...] to close and censor online forums and online communities is to create a less open and democratic society" (*Aftenposten* 5.08.2011). The discourse suggests that a democratic society requires an open arena for debates, and that some arguments are better than others; thus, one can obtain a true answer in the end. The *pressure-cooker discourse* finds the Norwegian debate too cramped. "It is always dangerous to gag those who resist a comprehension [...] We must invite the terrorist and his fellows of opinion to a debate before they become murderers. In other words, I call for an end to political correctness", writes yet another participant (*Morgenbladet* 29.07.2011).

A closer look at the contributors to the *pressure cooker discourse* reveals that these often voice critique of the newspapers for not having prioritised controversial opinions and the debates for being too "politically correct", dominated by elites. "When they [the press] prevent this valve [controversial opinions] from functioning, they shouldn't be surprised if it explodes in the end" (*Aftenposten* 25.07.2011). This discourse also includes a critique of media for excluding certain groups: "I demand to hear the extremist voices, so that I can disapprove of them!" (*Aftenposten* 4.08.2011). Most contributors to this discourse seem to speak "on behalf of" extremists in the sense that they take their anger and general situation for granted. Furthermore they argue that a (non-extremist) "we" should speak out against "them" (the extremists). This leaves a paradox: What is criticised in this discourse? A debate dominated by elites. Who speaks about this elite dominance? Mainly the elite: politicians, journalists, writers and academics. One explanation may be that elite persons are encouraged by journalists and editors; they are interviewed, and oftentimes asked to participate in important debates.

"We should not let Breivik amplify the pressure toward censorship and conformity further.[...] Let us not give this type of terrifying expressions [...] more traction", writes one researcher (*Aftenposten* 30.07.2011). This excerpt captures the very core of the *pressure cooker discourse*, as well as elaborating it further as a stand against indirect terrorist influence. Although the defenders of this discourse do not explicitly blame anyone but Breivik for the attacks, they implicitly suggest that restrictions on freedom of speech may be to

blame for the tragedy. The underlying argument is that “we” raise extremists by refusing to listen to them.

The many contributors partly blaming lack of free expression for the terror somehow diminish the responsibility of the terrorist himself, his plans and deeds – and the diagnosis of Norwegian society’s degree of openness remains disputed. While defenders of the above-mentioned discourse assert that (a presupposed) censorship and self-censorship are constraining democracy, others claim that self-censorship or a degree of sensitivity is recommendable. This entails that showing respect for one’s fellow human beings in public debates is pivotal in a democracy.<sup>9</sup> “We are not talking about censorship of expressions, but about keeping the democratic debate to the point” (*Dagbladet*, 28.07.2011), writes one contributor. Within this discourse, supporters claim that sensitivity will preserve a public sphere with enlightened and fruitful discussions and emphasise that one is responsible for one’s own expressions. “Freedom of expression is not freedom from responsibility” (*Vårt Land* 4.08.2011), says a researcher interviewed. Proponents of these and related views adhere to what we have labelled the *responsibility discourse*.

Here it is argued that spiteful expressions can engender more hate. “A lot of people presume that spiteful expressions work as valves. [...] But recent research has shown that hateful expressions lead to more hateful expressions”, writes another researcher (*Dagbladet*, 12.08.2011). A hallmark of the *responsibility discourse* is that writers refer to academic research, they are often themselves academics, or (to some extent) journalists. They argue that freedom of speech is not in any sense absolute. Some refer to law: “It may be time for Article §135a in the Punitive law to be tried by the system again. [...] it is okay to make the Attorney General aware of expressions that cross the line”, writes a former Attorney General (*Klassekampen* 30.08.2011). “An aspiration to kill each other cannot be protected by freedom of expression” (VG 25.07.2011), writes a group from the Norwegian Centre against Racism.

A subsequent question within this discourse is whether debate forums on the Internet should be subjected to the same restrictions as newspapers. “The problem is the many extreme websites and comment spaces in the digital newspapers. [...] These sites need to be cleaned up, not the regular debate in our society”, one professor argues (*Morgenbladet* 29.07.11). Contributors mention the Internet as a distinctive forum for spiteful expressions and also argue that the newspapers operating on the Internet and not least web publications such as *document.no* should exercise editorial responsibility:

[...] the editor’s responsibility entails one fundamentally positive factor: someone is seen as responsible [...] The growth of the digital media the last fifteen years has in several ways undermined this principle [...] pre-editing (which was always practiced before) is [at websites] by some almost considered as censorship, an attempt from the elites to reduce the common man’s freedom of expression” (*Klassekampen* 2.08.2011)

Moreover, debaters’ anonymity is questioned. “If you present a critique of a person or of a group that you do not feel like presenting face to face, maybe you should not have that [critique] printed” (*Morgenbladet* 9.09.11).

While the *pressure cooker discourse* presupposes a cramped Norwegian debate climate, the *responsibility discourse* to some extent blames a malicious and hateful debate culture for the attacks. What seems to connect the two discourses is that none of them consider the current Norwegian atmosphere for practicing freedom of speech as satisfactory, and to a degree they blame each other.

### 3.1 Unacceptable expressions?

The following is an analysis of some articles that occurred one month after the terror and the following days; they are selected since these items represent a rather principled debate on freedom of expression. It started with a chronicle in Norway’s largest newspaper (“Unacceptable expressions”, *Aftenposten* 22.08.2011). Four authors argued that during the last decade, the debate in Norway had been “particularly hateful”. They referred mostly not only to debates in the social media but also to mainstream media. As examples, they mentioned how Muslims in Norway had been called “quislings” and “Nazis” and been represented as a threat to “Norwegian values”. They wrote that freedom of expression is “not absolute” in any society – and addressed the relationship between speech and action: “To insist that there is an absolute division between words and deeds is accordingly to distance oneself from any moral responsibility for the reality that may emerge and has emerged from hateful expressions”.

This text doubts the assumption that the mass murderer would have refrained from his brutal deeds if he had had more access to mainstream media. As mentioned, ABB’s most frequent Norwegian media participation was on the web journal *document.no*. The editor of this journal in a later interview warns against linking words with deeds, while a critic of this editor says he (the editor) avoids deeper reflection on why ABB found a home on his website (*Klassekampen* 11. 11.2011). The four authors argue against the *document.no* editor: “[...] it is likely that his understanding of reality has been strengthened by a public sphere where the limits towards hateful expressions have been stretched very much during the last decade”. Thus, they reject the *pressure cooker discourse* and instead suggest a discourse of *freedom with responsibility*, related to *anti-racist* discourse. They also appeal to editors and moderators to stand firm against hateful expressions and to “say that not all expressions should be attributed the same value”, thus shunning a *relativist discourse* claiming that all expressions are equally worthy of representation.

### 3.2 The right to offend

This item not only generated some debate in *Aftenposten* but also trickled into other parts of the mainstream press, as the four authors are high-profiled individuals in the Norwegian public sphere. A smaller opinionated article occurred a few days later, referring to Article 135A in the Norwegian punitive law, “which actually bans racist and discriminatory expressions. If punishable expressions have been published the last years, everyone should have taken the responsibility to report the issue” (*Aftenposten* 25.08.2011). This writer’s concern is that freedom of expression is about having an opinion in the public sphere even if it offends others.

The limits are among others drawn at incitement to violence, hatred and discrimination. That is punishable. [...] The multicultural society creates tensions in all countries. The answer to the challenges facing us is not more surveillance and curbed freedom of expression, but to live with disagreement and tensions, keep our calm, preserve values, regulate anonymity and reject insensitivity using words as weapons (*Aftenposten* 25.08.2011).

This comment may contain a concession to the four, although it is unclear what “regulate anonymity” entails. Another comment

reads: "If we had the same relaxed relation to the law when it comes to traffic rules as to the laws entitled to regulate discrimination in the public sphere, probably very few of us would dare to use our car" (*Dagbladet*, 31.08.2011). It is here suggested that a lack of application of Article 135A during recent years may be due to lack of confidence in the fruitfulness of issuing complaints, since they are mostly overruled by Article 100 in the constitution.

Another opinion piece was published the day after under the headline "Dangerous unclarity" (*Aftenposten* 26.08.2011), where Conservative Party MOP Michael Tetzschner questioned some of the conclusions in the initial article. "The underlying question is almost fully expressed in the critique of the Freedom of expression commission: How are "we", the adult, grown-up, decent human beings going to limit the expressions of "the others", the immature, the indecent." Tetzschner furthermore criticises the four writers for promoting a caricature of free expression by stating that "every expression is given the same value", since that entails having no values at all: "When good and bad ideas start, it is not because all should win, but so that the bad ones should be rejected" [...] "The problem is not the socially unacceptable utterances, but what judicial limits that should constrain freedom of expression, in addition to norms for good behavior" (*Aftenposten* 26.08.2011). This writer suggests that by questioning whether it is a human right to express oneself in the public sphere, the four "downgrade freedom of expression as a value", and suggests that free expression will be less important in the future.

### 3.3 Anti-elite discourses and victims

From Tetzschner's arguments, we identify an *anti-elitist* discourse, blaming the four writers for situating themselves on a pedestal as "guardians" of the "less enlightened" ("immature") ones. He fears curbs on free expression as a more imminent danger than streams of intolerance and racism.

One of the four originators of this debate promotes a different *anti-elitist* discourse. By writing about the traditionally vulnerable sections of society and referring to the Freedom of Expression commission and its leader (a well-known professor presumably belonging to the elite), the writer asks with what right this leader can identify what kind of expressions we "must tolerate". Furthermore, he asks: "have those who never are subject to discrimination and abuse more rights than the ones who are [abused], to decide the limits of tolerance? Or should the authority be distributed in an opposite way, to the victims?" (*Klassekampen* 27.09.2011). Thus, the concern for vulnerable groups being subject to racist attacks is expressed.

These two *anti-elitist* discourses defend different non-elite rights: the victims of racism and discrimination – or the ones who harbour views that are not considered appropriate (racist, hostile to immigration or Islam). Both are supposedly overlooked by elite academics, editors and other members of the "chattering classes".<sup>10</sup> This debate also highlights two different victim positions, which have competed for attention in the post 22 July debate. The victim – albeit traditionally considered to be without much political or cultural capital – may at times, if recognised by many, inherit a position of power fuelled by the victim status (Kapelrud 2008).

In *Morgenbladet*, a commentator refers to the original chronicle and represents the terrorist and his sympathisers, as follows:

The ones who now, at the kitchen tables outside of the official Norway, say that they "agree a little with Breivik", do not of course

agree with what he has done. But they share his feelings of being without representation in the public sphere. Much worse than if Breivik has misguidedly thought that he acted on behalf of many, it is if he really has experienced his situation the way he claims he has. This entails that he is pressurized beyond all reasonable limits, from a conformity that does not leave space for his deepest convictions. (*Morgenbladet* 9-15.09.2011)

The above may be seen as a typical expression of the *pressure cooker discourse*. A different approach is made by one of the commentators in *Dagsavisen*. He writes that the Islam-sceptics represent the only group in the public debate, which has conquered the right to confuse opposition with gagging. "For years they have sulked about how impossible it is to debate immigration in this country while they have done so increasingly loud, on an increasing number of arenas and in a steadily harsher vocabulary" (*Dagsavisen* 1.10.2011). And when the bomb exploded, the author concludes, the ones to blame were not those who spoke like him [the terrorist], but the ones who opposed such rhetoric.

## 4 Discourses on multiculturalism


When it comes to our search for combinations of "multiculturalism" and "22 July", we find that articles written by editorial staff and non-editorial sources are present in almost equal numbers. Editorial news, opinion articles and reportage represent 53% of the items. The balance between the editorial- and non-editorial sources indicates that the newspapers in this period provided ample space for an open public discussion also on this issue.

A large proportion of the non-editorial sources represent the elite strata of society. As much as 83% of the contributors are either journalists, politicians, academics, represent organisations, pundits, high-level professionals or established writers in the public domain. It seems as if the post 22 July debate on this specific term is even more academic in its nature than other debates due to the mere concept in question. Men constitute 72% of the voices registered in the articles. This confirms the male dominance in the public debate, both in the columns and as sources in news stories. Actors with ethnic minority background represent 13.5% of the voices, and less than half of these are women.

### 4.1 The harmony discourse

One of the most prominent features of this debate appears to be a discourse advocating bridge building, more precisely formulated as *discourse of cohesion and harmony*, linked with the policy-definition of multiculturalism. The core of this discourse highlights an often occurring pattern throughout the post-terror coverage. First, we find an appreciation for the government and political leaders for coping with the situation in a mature and exemplary way, highlighting the Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg as a great and successful leader (according to the terrorist responsible for the "multiculturalist politics" in Norway). The following quotes exemplify this trend: "During the last few weeks I've reflected and been thinking, this is my country, and I'm so proud of it ..." writes an anthropologist (*Klassekampen*, 5.08.2011). And an editorial in the Norwegian business paper phrases this: "The rest [in addition to the Prime Minister] of the political leadership has also shown itself from its best side, and contributed to cohesion, not division. No one has tried to exploit

Table 3. National press: 22 Juli and "multikult\*": distribution per week. Source: Retriever search engine, 23.7.2011 to 31.10.2011, all national newspapers. The vertical dimension shows the number of articles, and the horizontal one the week number.



the tragic events to attack opponents or score political capital" (*Dagens Næringsliv* 27.07.2011).

Related is a coming-to-terms with the Norwegian society and its values. Many expressions published during these first 100 days discuss the term *multiculturalism* in a rather diplomatic way. People supportive of this or related concepts are in our period of analysis not much subjected to harsh examination. "Diversity is the answer"; a header from an article quoted below summarises this view towards multiculturalism:

A successful society is not just about how resources are allocated, but about recognition. It entails that societies, which include broadly and do not distinguish sharply between "insiders" and "outsiders" are successful societies. It's good to have structures in the society, which safeguard multiculturalism, and which allow immigrants not only to be integrated through education, work and so on, but which also let them preserve their own culture (*Klassekampen* 6.08.2011).

The discussions in the national press carefully approach the concept so fiercely attacked by the 22 July terrorist, and thereby often apply multicultural(ism) as a *descriptive* term when they counter his world views. Building bridges between groups of diverse backgrounds enhances Norway's reputation, which was contaminated by the terrorist's misdeeds. Primary contributors in this discourse are journalists, academics and grass roots citizens. This *discourse of cohesion and harmony* advocating caution relates to the *discourse of responsibility* in practicing free expression.

#### 4.2 The explanatory model

Another main discourse revealed through the items addressing multiculturalism is the *explanatory model*. Contributors try to uncover the driving forces behind the terrorist acts. A number of articles refer to the parts of ABB's Manifesto, where fear of multiculturalism and Islam is presented as the primary explanation for the terror attack. According to this publication, Breivik quit his *political* work against Islam and multiculturalism in 2002.<sup>11</sup> He writes that armed struggle seems to be the only fruitful way (*BergensTidende*, 24.07.2011).

Pundits, who counter this explanation, emphasise the importance of the debate being broad-based: media should include all voices, also minority nationalist and adherers to multiculturalism.

Norwegian author Cornelius Jakhelln writes about his inner "terror-virus" which he claims is latent in every human being. The "virus" infected him through his stay in a multicultural Parisian neighbourhood. According to Jakhelln, mocking, discrimination and exclusion from his multicultural neighbours started this "infection". He relates his own anger to the anger the terrorist must have felt. But instead of resorting to violent behaviour, Jakhelln got to express his feelings through poetry and writing (*Fædrelandsvennen*, 25.07.2011, *Morgenbladet* 29.07.2011). He underlines the importance of giving space to alternative views on multiculturalism to avoid the rage from turning violent and thus gives voice to the *pressure cooker discourse*.

Thus, throughout the first 100 days we register not only a cautious, *discourse of cohesion and harmony* (defending diversity) in the national press but also items related to the *pressure cooker discourse*. An underlying *explanatory discourse* may be identified, claiming that views critical of multiculturalism have been gagged by political correctness; thus, extremism flourishes among special elements in the Norwegian society. The positions concerning victimhood and responsibility for the terror are wide apart. But concerning multiculturalism, those who defend diversity adhere mostly to the *lived diversity* and *policy* definitions of multiculturalism; whereas the critical or more spiteful ones see the concept partly as misguided *policy* and partly as misleading *ideology*.

#### 4.3 What lessons to be drawn?

The debate following the chronicle "Unacceptable expressions" (see above) was one of the first occurring in the mainstream press after the terror. Another smaller debate started later, with an initial opinion piece from the editor of the web journal *HonestThinking.org*, this item also published in *Aftenposten*: "As long as we do not realise that Behring Breivik, in spite of his violence-appraising ideology and utopian visions, has a [valid] point, we cut ourselves off from one of the most important lessons to be drawn after the catastrophe this summer" (*Aftenposten* 13.10.2011). This editor, Ole Jørgen Anfinsen, known for his harsh views on Islam and immigration,

realised that the terrorist might have been inspired by some of his own writings. He claims that he has grieved with the griever and promises to scale down his rhetoric. He redefines “echo chambers” (see above), as sheltering the elite of the Norwegian society. Anfindsen asks if these chambers are only found among the critics of migration: in the “multicultural echo chamber such warnings [against negative consequences of migration] and counter arguments are not welcome; they are often rejected as intolerant”. He also refers to people operating within these “echo chambers” as likely to slowly destroy the confidence needed between “the people and the ruling in a functioning democracy.” Thus, he promotes one of the above-mentioned *anti-elite discourses* where the “people” is positioned as victim. To support his claim, he writes that for “many years we have seen that a number of nationally opinionated people do their utmost to prevent a broad-based, open debate on all sides of the problem”. In this combination of *anti-elite* and *victim discourse*, the deviant (here groups and individuals critical or hateful of migration) is represented as suffering from the elite’s arrogance.

Anfindsen had two direct responses to his opinion piece within the time frame of our material. Both were published in the same newspaper, the first one from Labour MOP Hadia Tajik. She attacks his views through suggestive parallelisms:

The question forcing itself to the forefront is: If Breivik “has a point”, does this imply that also Al-Qaida in-between all their glorification of violence “has a point”? Or does Anfindsen realize that the analyses behind the terror are so shaky that they need machine guns as crutches? (Aftenposten 17.10.2011).

Tajik rejects Anfindsen’s claims of Norway being subject to mass immigration and writes that only about 500,000 persons who have migrated, actually live in Norway, and more than half of them are from European countries. Furthermore, she refers to his views on “Islamic cultures” as rooted in a rather literal interpretation of the Quran. And she comments: “Ironically, he thus becomes a flag bearer for the Islamists. They think that one has to interpret the Quran literally to be a Muslim. Anfindsen seems to be of the same opinion”. Tajik also points to the fact that Anfindsen has had access to a range of Norwegian newspapers, and that his last book (Anfindsen 2010) received support from the Norwegian Free Expression foundation, thus claiming him being accepted as worthy of publishing.

The other article refers to Anfindsen’s claim of being victimised by “politicians, researchers, bureaucrats, media people and other people from the elite of [our] society” and these people hindering a broad and open debate. This writer describes the rhetoric as being less careful in Internet debates, where the “victim” position due to the elite conspiracy is more explicit.

The conspiracy’ against critics of immigration is in this case very inefficient. The immigration and asylum policy has become increasingly strict during the last 10 years. [...] Critics of immigration and Islam have all reasons to celebrate. [...] But opponents to immigration seem to feel more marginalized than ever. Anfindsen sympathizes with the Utøya-terrorist’s feeling: ‘our whole system is false’ and demand self-reflexion from ‘the architects behind’ (Aftenposten 18.10.2011).

This writer alleges that Norwegian editors are struck by a “collective Stockholm-syndrome of sorts” since they know that they are not part of a conspiracy against critics of migration. “Still they bow down to this rhetoric and underline the allegations about censorship

and gagging, out of fear for being seen as enemies of freedom of expression” (Aftenposten 18.10.2011). This writer suggests an editorial fear for not being seen as proponents of liberal freedom of expression.

## 5 Conclusion

Through our analysis, we have demonstrated the interrelatedness between some of the main discourses identified. Many of the newspaper items aim (explicitly or implicitly) at explaining the 22 July terror, but in very different ways. While some do see the Norwegian society with its diversity as basically sound (descriptive or policy-related multiculturalism) but threatened by offensive and hateful rhetoric which may ultimately stimulate violence (the *responsibility discourse*), others focus on Norwegian exclusionary political correctness and naïve positions when it comes to the “dangers of multiculturalism” (ideological) as responsible for hate speech and violence (the *pressure cooker discourse*). We find practically no traces of the extreme cultural relativist view that is targeted by writers who remain critical to the current diversity politics. On the other hand, media seem to open up more for writers with some kind of political relations to Anders Behring Breivik, such as the editors of *document.no* and *HonestThinking.org*. This may be due to a presupposition of these groups as marginalised and thus in need of representation to avoid the “lid blowing off”.

The competing discourses on these particular topics are rooted in deep political conflicts, known in other European countries, but may perhaps also be explained by media competition, since a medium favourably inclined to accommodate all kinds of expressions may be associated with strong cultural capital. And in addition to media’s explicit self-images as guardians of free expression, the debate occurs in an era of intensified competition for online readership and ad revenue. A relevant question is whether the “competition” related to being the best guardian of free speech may background another discussion, i.e. on how to develop a society in which racism, discrimination and racist-motivated terror do not threaten people’s lives and livelihood.

From the debates and coverage analysed, there seems to be no clear-cut consensus in Norway about the need to work towards such a society, since the diagnoses of the current situation differ substantially. The post 22 July discourses in the nation-wide press are dominated by elite participants, but elite participation in mainstream media is nothing new. But these media increasingly compete with web-based options for those who want to air their views, and where non-elite persons have more access. More research is needed to explore the unofficial “ranking” of media in first category (mainstream print newspapers, main TV channels), second (popular debates linked to mainstream media websites) and third category (weblogs, Facebook groups and “echo chamber” spaces). Furthermore, we need to question whether such an informal ranking may still produce feelings of being excluded from the larger society and being relegated to the “undergrowth” of social media. As John Steel argues, “The capacity that a person has to air his or her views on a blog is of course significantly different to that of a corporate news organization” (Steel 2012: 4). Further research also needs to address the different streams of online and social media and their variety of functions to be able to understand more profoundly the history of the post-22 July media debates.

The post 22 July coverage related to vital concepts for the democratic and social development of our society may be interpreted



in two ways: both as a sound proof of Norwegian openness and diversity of opinion; and as an indicator of a trend towards frozen victim positions and discourses leading towards less caution for the vulnerable who fear more discrimination and hatred. The “clash of definitions” (to paraphrase Said, 2003) is bound to develop further while Norway continues to heal her wounds.

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## Notes

1. For more on this issue, look at the report from Antirasistisk Senter: “Om trakassering av muslimer og innvandrere etter eksplosjonen i regjeringskvartalet 22.07.2011. <http://www.antirasistisk-senter.no/publikasjoner.5076758.html> [accessed 16.8.2012].
2. See the commission report: <http://22julikommissjonen.no/Rapport> Accessed 29.1.2013.
3. Last verdict under this article was passed in 2007, against Tore Tvedt from “Boot Boys” for racist expressions against Jews.
4. Document.no is a website where hostility to Islam and support for the state of Israel are important pillars. Their self-presentation is as a site where journalists from Norway and other countries write about current topics, especially concerning international

politics. They claim to be the first journalistic website using the weblog as a format (since 2003). Source: <http://www.document.no/om/>.

5. In July 2012, a right-wing extremist, antifeminist blogger threatened to kill a policeman on his highly controversial blog. He was arrested and accused for incitements of violence. Despite the fact that incitements of violence is illegal, and that he is considered a public figure publishing on a public blog, the Supreme Court ruled in his favour, due to the threat being published on the Internet and not in mainstream media. In his new year speech, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg said: “And nobody should [be allowed] to threaten others without consequences. Therefore, the government wants hateful expressions on the net to be punished. This spring we will suggest a proposition about this to the Parliament.” Source: [http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler\\_og\\_artikler/statsministeren/statsminister\\_jens\\_stoltenberg/2013/statsministerens-nyttarstale-2013.html?id=710868](http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler_og_artikler/statsministeren/statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/2013/statsministerens-nyttarstale-2013.html?id=710868) [accessed 20.1.2013].
6. After scrutiny, the number turned out to be smaller, but this table, generated by the research engine, shows the downsliding trend when it comes to numbers.
7. This category is not always easy to distinguish, but these voices were mostly individuals known from before by their participation in the public sphere, and belong to the category as either migrated to Norway or having parents who have done so [this in accordance with the categories used by Statistics Norway (SSB)].
8. The last 8% are contributions where the author is unknown (mainly editorials).
9. Most often the adherents to this discourse do not mention the concept “self-censorship”.
10. Defined by “The Free Dictionary” as follows: “educated people who like to discuss and give their opinions about political and social matters”. Source: <http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/the+chattering+classes> [accessed 29.01.2013].
11. Breivik was a member of the FrP (“Party of Progress”) or its Youth organization from 1997 to 2007; thus, this information partly contradicts his own. Source: <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Frp-Breivik-har-vart-medlem-og-har-hatt-verv-i-ungdomspartiet-5014741.html> [accessed 20.1.2013].

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